P = C F h(t,x(t),y(t),z(t))dt + g(t F ,x(t F )), where t F is the entry time of the trajectory (t, x(t)) into a given terminal set

= H(t,x,p)
(the Isaacs condition), then the two Isaacs-Bellman equations reduce to one:
in ^m+ 1 -F and 6{t, x) = g(t, x) for (t, x) e 8F. In (3) it was shown that if there exist (^-functions 0 and ft on 3$ m+1 such that
L<[> Ss 0 > L\]r in@™+i-F, and ${t,x) = #{t,x) = g(t,x)
for (t,x)e8F, then the game has value V and furthermore <f>{t o ,x o ) =* V < ^"(^^o)-Indeed only a local version of these conditions near dF is required. The main result of this paper is that if a one-sided version of (1) is available (for example if only (f> can be determined to fit the conditions of (1)) then the game has extended value in the sense described in (2) (see also the work of Friedman (9) , (10) , (11) on generalized values). This extends the result of (2), both in dropping the ' reverse Isaacs condition' and also in the fact that a generalized pursuit-evasion automatically leads to a one-sided version of (1) with 0 = 0. It turns out that in order to obtain results on generalized values it is necessary to study another type of differential game, one in which we assume that the minimizer has the option of stopping the game at any time r prior to the entry time into the terminal set t F , and then accepting a pay-off depending on the time T. Such games we call games of optional stopping and we develop for them a theory completely analogous to the theory developed in (3) for games of survival. 
Values in evolutionary games
U = ^(() «>o F -= sup(tt(a):ae (J r , (a)), a>0 °Q + = sup inf v(fi), Qj = inf sup u(oc), Q+= inf Q+, Q-= sup Q~.
8>0
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It is easy to verify that:
We say that the game has value if y+ = yand strong value if Q + = Q--Throughout this paper the evolutionary game under consideration will be governed by a differential equation controlled by J Y , and J z . In sections 2-6 we consider a particle whose position in & m+1 is given by co-ordinates (x, £) (xelffl 1 ", £,£&) controlled by an equation -£=f(t,x,y,z), = 8-(t,x,p,l) .j 3. Fixed time games. We now assume that the differential game is governed by (2) subject to x(t 0 ) = x 0 , £(< 0 ) = £ 0 and the pay-off is given by
where 
H+(t,x,p) = H-(t,x,p).
(8) A similar problem was met in (2) where a condition similar to (7) was assumed; later Friedman (10) showed that (8) only was necessary, although his results referred to a slightly different concept of value. However, Friedman's arguments form the basis of this section. 
for t o^t ^T. Then V+-V-^ eiT-toKB Proof. Suppose first that g is C 3 and 8 > 0; assume without loss of generality that g vanishes outside some compact set (this is permissible since 8 > 0). We consider the Cauchy problems: subject to w(t, x, £) = g(x, g). Then by results of Friedman ( (7), (8) , p. 205) and Fleming ((5), (6) ) the Cauchy problems (9) and (10) have unique solutions Wf, W~ in the strip t 0 < t ^ T, which vanish at infinity. Furthermore e->0
V-= Mm
e->0
by the results of (4).
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For /i > 0 we define Then W+ i/t satisfies (9) subject to
by (iii) and equally
Then by a standard comparison argument, using the fact that 8+ is independent of £ we obtain for t 0 < t ^ T. A similar argument is also used later so we will not justify this step (cf. Friedman (8) , pp. 201-202). Thus we have
ow consider the function for some A e^. As in Lemma 6-2 of (l) 6 is bounded and approaches zero at infinity for t 0 ^ t ^ T. Hence 9 must obtain its maximum at a point (t, x, f) where t 0 ^ i < T. At this point we have Hence applying the first part to y, we obtain the lemma. Similarly we obtain the result for 8 = 0 by approximation from the case 8 > 0. THEOREM 
3-2. Suppose g is continuous (but not necessarily Lipschitz) and increasing in £ and that the Isaacs condition
Proof. For g Lipschitz this is Lemma 3-1. In general the result follows by uniform approximation of g.
4.
Optional stopping games. In this section we describe a rather more complicated type of differential game which we call an optional stopping game. We first define stopping time T as a map T:
t 
o^t^T (y(-),z(-))
where r = T{y{-), z(-)). We shall regard E and rjr as initially fixed, but allow differing choices of T and <j>. Thus we shall refer to the various values of G TiE (t 0 ,x 0 ,£ 0 ; 0,rjr) by V+{t o ,x o ,£ 0 ; (j>), etc., suppressing mention of E and rjr.
Suppose F is a closed subset of [0, oo) x ^m +1 such that for some T > 0
F.
Then we can define a particular stopping time t F as the least time such that the trajectory (t, x(t), £(*)) eF; F is called the terminal set. Suppose g: [0, oo) x ^m+ 1 -+ £% is a fixed continuous function. In the special case T = t F ,<j> = (7 we shall suppress mention of 0 and T and refer to G{t 0 , x 0 , £ 0 ) and V + (t 0 , x 0 , E, Q ), etc. Thus the functions V + , V~, etc. defined on [0,oo) x ^m + 1 are the value functions of this particular game. Before proceeding with the formal discussion of optional stopping games, it might be helpful to describe a particular example, to be discussed in detail in section 7. Suppose a differential game has dynamics x = f(t, x, y, z) subject to x(t 0 ) = x 0 . Suppose that it is the object of J z to force (t, x) as close as possible to some terminal set F before time T, but that J z is restricted by a fuel limitation h{t, x, y, z) < A JU (where usually h ^ 0). This game can be described as follows: it has dynamics dx
subject to x(t 0 ) = x 0 , £(<") = 0, and pay-off
where p(t, x) is the distance of (t, x) from F and the terminal set F% is given by {(t, x, E), where t^ T or £ ^ A}. This is a particular case of an optional stopping game, which besides being of interest in its own right, can be used to study pursuit-evasion games; in such games the fuel consumption between hitting the terminal set is the pay-off.
In this section our objective is simply to generahze the dynamic programming theorems of (3) to this new setting. In fact the proofs are identical and so we shall restrict ourselves to the statement and one sample proof. THEOREM 
4-1. Suppose r is a stopping time on
M y (t 0 ) x M z (t 0 ) such that r < t F everywhere. Then (i) U T (t 0 ,x 0 ,£ 0 ; U) = U{t 0 ,x 0 ,£ 0 ), V T (t 0 ,x 0 ,£ 0 ; V)= V(t o ,x o ,£ o ). (ii) F+(« o , *",£"; V+) ^ V+(t o ,x o ,g o ), V-(t 0l x 0 ,£ 0 ; V~)> F-ftj.Zo.go). (iii) If further 0 < s ^ T everywhere: G£T(*O.*O.£>; Qt) > Qt(t o ,x o ,£o),
HJs, rt^O'^O'feO' Qs ) ^ Qs V'O'^O'^OI'
Proof. We shall prove the first inequality of (iii). For e > 0 and Now suppose y = y{-)eM T {t 0 ) and let P be the pay-off P(y,fi'y). Then
where
and
pe E Let P' = min(P 1) P 4 ); then P ' is the pay-off in G(cr,x(cr), £(cr)) corresponding to (y, z) where y and z are the restrictions of y and fl'y to if r (cr) and ^( c ) . Now
Since /?(o-; x(a), £,{<?),jFy~)e\{s\Wy)
Hence P ' < Q+(<r, x{a), £{<r)) + e and P = min (P',P 3 ) < min (P 3 , Q+(<r, x{a), g(a))) + e.
However min (P 3 , Q^"(cr, x{a), £,{<?))) is the pay-off of (y,fl'y) or {y,P*y) in the game with stopping time T and <j> = Q£. Thus the value v'(fi*) of /?* in this game satisfies where v(/?') is the value of/?' in G(t 0 , x 0 , g 0 ).
If /?*eA t (s|z) then /?'e A f (s|z) and so we obtain the desired inequality, since /?* is arbitrary. For later use we require a modification of Theorem 5-5, in which we relax the Lipschitz assumption on h; we shall assume instead that h is continuous. We shall write K h = oo if h is continuous but not Lipschitz. where the subscript n refers to the game G n with h n replacing h.
If (y( •), z( •)) is a pair of controls inducing trajectories {x( •), £( •)) in G and (x( •), E, n ( •))
in O n then " \mUt)\^{Tt) (t^t^T) { and
\P-P n \$l(T-t 0 )Kl,
where P, P n are the pay-offs in G and G n . Thus
V+(t o ,x o ,£ o )-V-(t o ,x o ,^) ^ (eA 2 + -+l) (T-t o )Kt.
Letting »->oowe obtain the theorem. Proof. For K g < oo, ^ < oo this is a special case of Theorem 5-6; by approximating g and rjr by Lipschitz functions uniformly on compact sets the general result follows easily (note that the approximations must be chosen to satisfy (i) and (ii) of Theorem 5-5; this is, however, quite simple).
Finally, we observe that similar argument to that of Theorem 5-5, using the results of (4) shows that without any assumptions on the Hamiltonians H+ and H~ we can deduce that F + = U and V~ = V. In this case we can again assume K h = % oo, K g < oo and Kp < oo as in Theorem 5-7.
Games of survival with optional stopping. Suppose now that the terminal set satisfies only the condition F => [T, oo) x & m+1
, so that G ceases to be a fixed time game. We suppose now that \jr = g and that g is continuous (i.e. K g ^ oo) so that the pay-off takes the form P = inf(g(a,x((x),E,(a)): a < t F ,creE or a = t w ). We shall now call G a game of survival with optional stopping. Following section 6 of (3) and say that (t 0 , x 0 , £ 0 ) e J 1 is Q~ -regular if Proof. This is Theorem 6-3 of (3) 
-(or Q~-) regular if every point of F is Q + -(or Q~-) regular, letp(t, z,£) = disb{{t,x,g}; F).
Let cr = min (p(t 0 , x x , &),/>(«", x 2 , £ 2 )).
Suppose (y(-),z(-))eM Y (t 0 )xM 2 (t 0 )
and let («,(*), £(*)), {x t (t), £,(<)) be the corresponding trajectories subject to the initial conditions x±(t 0 ) -x lt £j(£ 0 ) = £ x and x 2 (t 0 ) = x 2 , g 2 (t 0 ) = £ 2 respectively. Then 
This generalizes the Theorems 6-4 and 8-1 of (3) combined. We omit the proof as a similar argument is employed later in a more special case.
Restricted fuel games.
A game of survival with optional stopping will be called a restricted fuel game if (i) F = {(t, x, £) t> T or £ > A} for some (A, T), (ii) g is monotonically increasing in £ for each fixed (t, x), (iii) E -[0, oo) (i.e. optional stopping is allowed at any time). We interpret such games as allowing the minimizer J z to stop at any time before this 'fuel' £ or time t is exhausted. and terminal pay-off Q + . We deduce Q+(t n ,x n ,£ n ; Q+) = Q-(t n ,x n ,£ n ; Q+).
Similarly Q~(t n ,x n , £ n ; Q-) = Q~(t n ,x n , i n ) and so
Q~{t n ,x n , g n ; Q+)-Q~(t n ,x n ,i n ; Q~) = Q+{t n ,x n , £ n )-Q~(t n ,x n , g n )
Therefore there exists a trajectory (x(t), £(<)) with
so that E, n+1 ^ A . Hence we deduce Q+(t n , x n , U -Q~(t n , x n , U > \d for all n, and since t n ^ TV n,t n ->ifor some I. Since also Now by the regularity of the boundary, condition (12),
and we deduce 6 < 0, contradicting our initial assumption.
8. Quasi-pursuit-evasion games. We now give some applications of the theory, which we have developed in the preceding sections. We shall consider a differential game of survival G with no optional stopping. The game has dynamics 
P= { h h(t,x(t),y(t),z(t))dt + y(t F) x(t F )),
where F is the terminal set, and F : => [T, oo) x 8%™ for some T. We introduce an extra co-ordinate £ given by
S(*o) = 0 and then the pay-off may be given as say.
4» approximate strategy, A for J F (see (2)) is a sequence (a n ) of delay strategies (i.e.a n e (J T s (t 0 )); a similar sequence B = (/? n ) is an approximate strategy for J z . Then and we say that G has extended value if Vf = Vj.
G is called a generalized pursuit-evasion game if y = 0 and h ^ 0. It was shown in (2) that under the extended Isaacs condition (7) , that a generahzed pursuit-evasion game has extended value. Later Friedman(n) improved this by requiring only the Isaacs condition (8) , although his formulation of extended value is different in general.
We shall say that G is a quasi-pursuit-evasion game if h*(t, x) = max min h(t, x, y, z) ^ 0 and y = 0. (3) there is a function r\: (0,oo) -> (0,oo) with limTJ(S) = 0 such that whenever (t^x^gJeC and ^(^eJlfVCi) t n e n there exists 0 s0 a e T t (s\y) such t h a t for a n y (z( •)>£(*)) with Hence for e > 0, there is a delay strategy fi n for J z whose value in (?* is less than 1/n. Let B = (fi n ) be the induced approximate strategy for J z in G, and let A = (a n ) be any approximate strategy for J Y . Then (a n ,fl n ) induce a sequence (£"(•)>£»(')) °f trajectories, such that for each n there exists t n with As e > 0 is arbitrary we conclude V} < A o .
h(t,x(t),az(t),z(t)) > h*(t,x(t))-V (s)
Conversely F^0_ e = (J > 0, so that for some delay strategy a for J r , the value^of a in 6r* 0 _ e is at least £#. If A = (a) (i.e. the constant sequence a) then we may show easily (cf. (2)) that for any B ] ^ A 0 + e.
Hence Vj ^ A o and so Vj = Vf = A o . Now suppose A = 0; for each e > 0 we may replace h by h e = h + e to obtain a game G e in which the Isaacs condition still holds, and Vj e = Vf tC . By Lemma 8-2 we obtain that for any e > 0.
9. General games of survival. We conclude with our main theorem on games of survival, of which Theorem 8-3 is a special case. Hence it follows that G has extended value by Theorem 8-3. As pointed out in the introduction, the curious feature of this result is that the existence of two functions <j> and r/r with L(j> > 0 > Ltfr on ^m +1 -F and <j> = i/r = y on dF implies the existence of value, not just extended value. This result therefore fits the idea of extended value into context as a first step towards the existence of value. In a quasi-pursuit-evasion game the function \jr = 0 satisfies the hypotheses.
